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Betting on Performed Futures 
Predictive Procedures at Delhi Racecourse
Stine Simonsen Puri
“Stine, which horse do you fancy?”
“I am not sure. Which do you like?”
“I am thinking of backing [betting on] number three.”
“Why?”
“I don’t think the favorite is on job [not trying to win]. That owner has two horses running, and I 
think he will have number three win even though number five is better, so that he can make some 
money with long odds.”
 — A bettor fifteen minutes before a race at the Delhi racecourse
I n this article I focus on procedures for predicting the near future among bettors at Delhi Racecourse. The paper is based on my long- term fieldwork at the Delhi racecourse, and a number of other race-courses in India, between 2009 and 2010.1 I argue that the short- term speculations in the near future, 
as represented in betting decision making, are oriented toward predicting people rather than horses. 
This is tied to the dominant idea that a large proportion of races are fixed or manipulated by people. 
The future is therefore not considered to be an open- ended event subject to laws of chance, but rather 
a spectacle, orchestrated by the people in the racing industry in order to make money from betting on 
races, while concealing the underlying reality of race fixing. Understanding people’s intentions, as well as 
being connected to those who might know something about the races or by figuring out patterns in the 
ways races are fixed, is therefore key to attempts of predicting future outcomes.
First, it is important to note that I am not working from the assumption that there are manipulated 
races in the Indian racing industry, as this is something I have been unable to determine, as the very 
nature of race fixing is that it is a secret. Rather than this being a study on the practice of race fixing, 
inspired by the work of Arjun Appadurai, I am looking into how the imagination of a manipulated future 
structures procedures for prediction, thereby painting the picture of a certain kind of calculative ethos 
that fuses methods of probability and the anticipations of possible performed futures.2 The future imagi-
nary at the racecourse opens up to various procedures of prediction that attempt to reveal concealed 
information and economic exchanges as ways of acting upon the socioeconomic structures behind the 
racing spectacle.
3. See Bear et al., “Speculation,” in this issue.
4. Bettors sometimes change their minds on 
what to bet once inside the betting ring, as 
they use the odds to determine possible fixed 
futures. This is a complex practice, which I 
have described elsewhere. See Puri, “Betting 
on People.”
5. See Shah, “Morality, Corruption, and the 
State”; Gupta, “Narratives of Corruption”; 
Parry, “The Crisis of Corruption”; and Gupta, 
“Blurred Boundaries.”
6. See Hacking, The Emergence of Probability.
7. For further discussion see Morgenstern and 
Neumann, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior.
8. See Peirson and Blackburn, “Betting at Brit-
ish Racecourses”; Smith, “The Impact of Tipster 
Information”; Schnytzer and Shilony, “Is the 
Presence of Inside Traders Necessary?”; Bruce 
and Johnson, “Investigating Betting Behav-
ior”; and Edelman, “A Competitive Horse- Race 
Handicapping Algorithm.” 
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I purposely use the phrase procedures of pre-
diction, rather than simply the word prediction, in 
order to emphasize it as a social practice and not 
just a question of knowledge and intellectual cal-
culation. I define procedures for prediction as a 
method of managing information under uncer-
tainty. This is a form of speculation, character-
ized by the goal of making money from future 
uncertainties, as well as by the kind of knowledge 
production activated, which is based primarily on 
figuring out concealed layers of reality rather than 
building upon known facts.3
When I argue that bettors bet on people 
rather than on horses, it has to do with the idea 
that it is foremost the people, and not the horses, 
that are thought to make the outcomes of the 
races. People instruct the jockeys in how the 
horses are to perform — they perform futures al-
ready scripted. This could be a future scripted by 
a bookmaker wanting to cash in the money that 
has been placed with him on a favorite horse, or 
a horse owner, who has made a deal with another 
horse owner on which of their horses should win 
(the horse that they will both bet on). It could also 
be a future fixed by a jockey owing another jockey 
a favor after haven given him information on an-
other race. Despite the idea of the races being 
spectacles of performed futures, they are imbued 
with uncertainty. During the time of my fieldwork, 
bettors could never reach any certainty about how 
the future had come into being or who had ar-
ranged it — and neither could I. We were all left to 
speculate about the endless possibilities.
Examining the predictive procedures in 
such a setting, which to a great extent also deter-
mines what bettors bet,4 reveals something about 
how contingency is imagined and acted upon. 
Part of the contingency of horse racing in India 
is thus not just tied to the horses and their bodies, 
but woven into imagined economic systems of ex-
change of money and information among jockeys, 
bookmakers, horse owners, bettors, and the mafia 
(and their friends and families). In the article I 
will show how the assumed presence of race fixing 
does not represent a threat to the betting economy, 
but rather is part of its attraction, especially so, it 
seems, for the younger generation, as new methods 
for predicting a fixed future is developing.
The racecourse, despite its complexity, of-
fers a simplified and bounded speculative market 
where stakes are made on events (races) finalized 
every thirty minutes. On one hand, the racecourse 
gives us insight into the kind of speculations that 
are made in an Indian economic system, which 
is characterized by an overarching discourse of 
corruption that foregrounds the failures of the 
economy.5 This is a system where people are not 
believed to be playing by the existing rules and 
laws and where bribes and kickbacks are thought 
to be a necessary route to success. On the other 
hand, the racecourse also enables an exploration 
of modes of speculation more generally and of par-
allels to gambling and financial markets outside 
the Indian context.
Observations from gambling and game- 
playing settings have been central to the develop-
ment of economic theories, such as probability 
theory6 and game theory,7 and more specifically 
behavioral economics and finance concerned with 
decision making under uncertainty. Gambling 
markets continue to be studied by economists as 
empirical sites; for example, horse- betting markets 
are analyzed in order to understand more complex 
financial markets.8 Yet, such analyses rest upon a 
narrow understanding of probability theories, 
and they neglect the social context of particular 
biases or instances of incorrect information. These 
theories of decision making are developed out of 
ideas of games existing beyond bounded social 
and cultural contexts. Thus they are interested in 
identifying universal laws of behavior under vari-
ous circumstances.
9. See Van Wyk, “Tata ma Chance”; Malaby, 
Gambling Life; Malaby, “Fateful Misconcep-
tions”; Jansbøl, Det Danske Spillemiljø; and Cas-
sidy, “Gambling as Exchange.”
10. Geertz, “Deep Play.”
11. All the names of people and horses are 
pseudonyms.
12. See “Wagering: Facts and Figures,” In-
ternational Federation of Horseracing Au-
thorities website, last accessed August 12, 
2015, www.horseracingintfed.com/Default 
.asp?section=Resources&area=4.
13. Thompson, “Betfair.”
14. Saini and Sethi, Law Relating to Gambling, 
53.
15. See Birla, Stages of Capital, and Hardgrove, 
Community and Public Culture.
16. The information is based on a survey I con-
ducted at the Delhi racecourse in March 2010 
with 109 respondents.
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East  •  35:3  •  20154 6 8
Anthropological studies on gambling, con-
versely, enable a critique of contemporary theo-
retical attempts to analyze behavior in speculative 
markets. Such studies have shown that the key to 
understanding gambling lies in the social and cul-
tural context in which the game takes place, and 
not simply in the internal structure of the game.9 
The perception of uncertainties in the game is 
thus located beyond the game itself, in the socio-
economic context in which the game takes place. 
One of the first ethnographic studies to illustrate 
this is the widely known text of Clifford Geertz, 
“Deep Play: Notes a Balinese Cockfight.”10 Al-
though this text is not often read in order to un-
derstand gambling behavior specifically, Geertz 
nevertheless shows how stakes depend on the own-
ers of the cocks, and their position in the local hi-
erarchy, rather than the cocks themselves. In this 
article, I investigate whether a similar dynamic 
is at stake in Delhi, where the uncertainty of the 
horses has to do with the social context in which 
the horses are running.
Addressing decision making under uncer-
tainty is particularly interesting in an Indian set-
ting, which has often been characterized as an 
economy of corruption. Rather than defining the 
racecourse as an economy of corruption, I simply 
examine it in terms of exchange — both imagined 
and real exchanges of money and information. My 
hope is that using the analytical framework of the 
anthropology of finance and comparing it with 
other forms of gambling may offer a fresh look at 
economic uncertainty in India.
In the article, I describe two different bettors 
whom I have followed over a long period of time: 
Chipper, who uses his cell phone to buy inside 
information, and Mr. Singh, who uses statistics.11 
What these two different methods of managing in-
formation have in common is an imagination of 
the future as fixed by people. Before turning to 
Chipper and Mr. Singh, though, I will give a short 
introduction to horse racing and betting in India 
and at the Delhi racecourse.
Betting at the Delhi Racecourse
According to the official statistics, betting on horse 
racing in India has been on the rise, with a total 
reported turnover of approximately 500 million 
dollars in 2012, more than double what it was ten 
years earlier.12 The extent of gambling in India is, 
however, difficult to estimate, as most gambling 
activity exists in the informal sector, and in 2009 
the total informal betting market was estimated 
at a 60 billion dollar annual turnover.13 Except for 
casinos on the shore of Goa, only horse- race bet-
ting and state lotteries (offered in a few states) are 
legal.14 This is based on legislation from the late 
nineteenth century that was founded upon the ar-
gument set forth among Britishers in India that at 
the racecourses, unlike among bookmakers in the 
streets of the Indian bazaars, a form of gambling 
could exist that demanded knowledge and skills 
beyond cheating and manipulations of results and 
beyond mere games of chance.15
The Delhi racecourse was built in 1940 and is 
located next to the prime minister’s home. Despite 
the prominent location, the racecourse is in decay 
and is not a place that is visited by the prime min-
ister or other high- profile people or used for occa-
sional socializing. The people who do come there, 
though, come at least once a week and only to 
bet. On a daily basis, approximately 3,000 bettors 
come to the races from all corners of the city, bet-
ting amounts ranging from 10 rupees to 500,000 
(15 cents and 8,000 USD) rupees per bet.16 Apart 
from the prime minister’s home and a more ex-
clusive polo ground, surrounding the racecourse 
are the stables, as well as a slum inhabited by peo-
ple working in various ways with racing, either as 
horse caretakers, “riding boys,” jockeys, cleaners, 
or betting- machine operators.
The Delhi racecourse hosts live racing ap-
17. All of these horses were running during the 
fieldwork, but their names have been switched 
around.
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proximately fifty days of the year, but it is open 
most days from around 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
On days with no live races, one can bet on the ap-
proximately 3,000 races held yearly in eight of the 
ten cities that today have operating racecourses in 
India. During this time, races from one of these 
cities are shown every thirty minutes on small 
television screens set up in various corners of the 
racecourse.
There are different ways of betting. You can 
bet either through the totalisator terminals han-
dled by the club management or through one of 
the twenty- six bookmaker firms in the betting 
ring. There is also the option of placing your bet 
with one of the unlicensed bookmakers walking 
around the grounds, or you can bet from home by 
calling up “cutters” who place the bets for you at 
the racecourse while charging a fee.
Since the introduction of cell phones to 
India the illegal betting market has been on the 
rise. Today, it is easy to act as a bookmaker, as 
long as you have access to odds either from being 
present at the racecourse or from getting the in-
formation through the cell phone. To be able to 
compete with the large informal betting market, 
the licensed bookmakers also do most of their 
business beyond taxation. Based on my survey and 
interviews with bookmakers, I have estimated that 
only around 11 percent of all betting at the Delhi 
racecourse was reported and figured in the official 
statistics.
This means that limited finances are col-
lected for the race club, which again means that ex-
cept for the rare cup races, there is little money to 
be made from winning a race in Delhi, sometimes 
less than 100,000 rupees to be shared among the 
owner, trainer, and jockey. Considering that some 
bettors (3 percent) bet more than 100,000 rupees 
on a single race, there is much more money to be 
made from the bookmakers through the wagers 
put on the races than there is from the race club 
prizes. For example, one can make a lot of money 
from losing a race with a favorite horse, if one has 
made a deal with a bookmaker to share the bets 
wagered on that horse. This only represents one 
of the ways in which race fixing is thought to take 
place. In the following, I will unpack ways of en-
gaging with the uncertainty of possible fixed fu-
tures at the Delhi racecourse.
Chipper and His Cell Phone:  
“This Is Very Secret Information”
I met Chipper a month into my fieldwork. I was 
standing alone looking at the horses doing their 
rounds in the paddock before the race was to start. 
Chipper came over to me without looking at the 
horses and told me to meet him “ just after the 
fifth race over there [he pointed to where]. I have 
some information for you,” he said. Then he left. 
I never turned up where he suggested because I 
had been busy talking to another bettor. Later in 
the day Chipper approached me again, his face 
red with excitement. He told me that he had won 
500,000 rupees (approximately 8,000 USD) in the 
previous race after he had bet 50,000 on the horse 
Trusted Friend with the odds 1/10.17 Chipper said: 
“I have really good contacts. We have a cell phone. 
I could not give information when I met you be-
fore because this is very secret information. The 
information was only confirmed after the horse 
had taken its round [in the paddock].”
I was excited for him. He did not seem like a 
man I would have thought had that kind of money. 
His English was limited and the way he carried 
himself did not command much respect. Chip-
per was a jovial man in his thirties with an open 
and searching look in his eyes. He wore jeans, a 
T- shirt, and trainers and had his hair slicked back 
with wax. He had a large smile, which emphasized 
his puffy and reddish cheeks. His excitement was 
contagious, and I could not help but be amazed at 
how his money had multiplied.
When I came to the racecourse the following 
day I looked for him, curious to know how he was 
getting the information. I found him with a large 
group of friends who were all attentive to what he 
was going to play in the next race. He told us that 
he had more information and asked whether I 
wanted to bet. As betting was part of my method of 
participant observation, I gave him 1,000 rupees 
18. Parry, “The Crisis of Corruption,” 28.
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East  •  35:3  •  2015470
and told him to bet for me whatever he was bet-
ting. A couple of minutes later I was 3,000 rupees 
richer.
Chipper was excited for both of us. He said 
that he thought he had finally found a reliable 
source. He had never met the person who gave 
him the information. According to him it was his 
friend’s brother, a petty trainer. This trainer was 
a friend of a big trainer in Mumbai, who appar-
ently owed Chipper’s friend’s brother a favor, and 
for which reason he provided him with informa-
tion. Chipper called his source in the morning and 
found out which horses he should consider “back-
ing.” When he entered the racecourse, instead of 
depositing his cell phone, which most attendees 
did, he paid the 2000- rupee daily fee it cost to 
bring a cell phone inside the racecourse. He ex-
pected his source to confirm the information ap-
proximately ten minutes before the race, when the 
final decision on how the future was to unfold had 
been made. Sometimes the information was given 
over the phone, and other times it could be a sign 
given by the jockey in the paddock. For example, 
if the jockey held his whip in his left hand when he 
got on the horse, Chipper would know this meant 
his horse would win, and if he held it in the right it 
meant that it would not win. Chipper gave 10 per-
cent of what he won to his source after each race 
for which he had received correct information, 
which the day before had reached 50,000 rupees. 
The money was transferred through a network of 
exchange among bookmakers and bettors across 
the country.
Over the next couple of months, I often bet 
with Chipper and also spent evenings with him, at 
his home, drinking with his friends from the race-
course. Chipper was living in a small, rented, bar-
ren room. His family owned land in a rural area 
in Northern India, some of which they had been 
selling off, and some of which they were utilizing 
for farming. The income from both was put toward 
Chipper, who, as the oldest son, was getting sup-
port to set up a real estate business in Delhi. The 
money, however, was by and large spent at the race-
course, and he had been doing that for a couple 
of years now, apparently without his parents know-
ing. Chipper’s life was immersed in secrets, both 
toward his parents and his wife, who was not living 
in Delhi and was apparently unaware of his love af-
fairs and short, lavish trips to the casinos of Macao, 
after winning large amounts.
For Chipper the outcome of a race was not 
evaluated according to whether or not there had 
been race fixing involved. He did not explicitly dis-
tinguish between a reality that was naturally deter-
mined and one that was manipulated. There was 
no objective future, just a future that one could 
have more or less, good or bad information on. 
When he lost, he did not complain that the races 
might have been fixed. Rather, he just evaluated it 
as a sign of a weak source. At times he spoke of the 
problem of multiple attempts to fix the same race. 
Even though his source had been given the correct 
information — based on the information given, 
for example, by the horse owners — the jockey of 
the horse could have been paid by a bookmaker 
to perform differently. These overlapping and 
competing attempts at fixing the future meant 
that there was always an uncertainty tied to the 
information he was given. Chipper therefore held 
on to his information source despite receiving in-
formation that turned out to be wrong, thinking 
that in the end futures could never be fixed with 
certainty.
Winning, on the other hand, was always 
taken as a sign of acquiring unique information. 
At times Chipper would not even talk about bet-
ting on “information” but on “confirmation.” 
When he got a tip, he considered it as a tip on a fu-
ture that had been confirmed by those creating it. 
When asked about who he thought was controlling 
the races, he revealed that he thought that not only 
the Indian mafia in Mumbai but also the Middle 
Eastern mafia were involved; however, he did not 
know the details about how it was done.
The economy of inside information has 
certain parallels to the economy of bribes. Jona-
than Parry, in an article on corruption in India, 
explores how the overriding idea of corruption af-
fects economic exchanges.18 He is interested in how 
an imaginary of an economic system of hidden 
bribes is generative of certain kinds of economic 
19. Ibid., 36.
20. Hansen and Verkaaik, “Urban Charisma,” 20.
21. Ibid., 16.
22. Ibid., 21.
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exchanges within it. Parry describes the bribes in-
volved in the recruitment process at a steel com-
pany in the state of Chhattisgarh, noting how such 
transactions are motivated by the dominant notion 
that bribes are the only possible route to a future 
job offer. How the system works on this assumption 
of corruption can be illustrated through the role 
of the dalal, a middleman or “commission agent” 
who is paid in order to improve the possibilities 
of getting a job for the bribe payers.19 Contact to 
a dalal was established through the extended net-
works of both parties, and consequently, the dalal 
for the bribe payer was neither a stranger nor a 
friend, but someone in between, someone who was 
both trusted and under suspicion. The idea of cor-
ruption, nevertheless, put the dalal in a lucrative 
position. If the bribe payer gets the job — for no 
matter what reason — it is interpreted as a conse-
quence of the bribe. If the bribe payer does not get 
the job, it is simply a sign that it did not work out 
as intended because the dalal as a middleman was 
not the person in complete control.
The position of the dalal is not unlike the po-
sition of the cell- phone informer in horse racing. 
The informer at the Delhi racecourse was also a 
figure who took on a role in between friend and 
stranger. Chipper’s contact was mediated through 
an acquaintance who was put into the category of 
a friend, or at least a friend of the family, which 
framed the relationship as one with the potential 
for trust. Nevertheless, there was always an aware-
ness that the informer might be cheating and giv-
ing away inside information, even though he did, 
in fact, not have any. Yet, because of the idea that 
the system of horse racing in itself was manipu-
lated, for Chipper there was no alternative but to 
trust the informer — as in the case with the dalal.
Parry’s analysis shows how the idea of cor-
ruption also enables bribes and parallel econo-
mies; similarly, I argue that the speculation on 
fixed futures enables the existence of an economy 
of inside information. Jockeys, for example, who 
themselves make less than 10 percent of the win-
ning amount of the races, can thus profit from sell-
ing information on races based on the assumption 
that there is consistent race fixing. They can sell 
this information whether or not they know of any 
predecided outcome. Inside information is in such 
great demand that it does not threaten their sale 
if the “information” turns out to be true. Besides 
jockeys, there are a large number of people sell-
ing inside information at various prices, such as 
friends of jockeys, riding boys, trainers, and assis-
tants, some of whom are present at the racecourse 
and others who are reached by cell phone.
According to Thomas Blom Hansen and 
Oskar Verkaaik, a characteristic of the postco-
lonial city is the existence of what they call an 
“urban specialist.”20 These are figures supposedly 
“in the know” based on their connections to peo-
ple in power, who act in spaces immersed in un-
predictability.21 According to Hansen and Verkaaik 
the ultimate embodiment of the urban specialist 
is the taxi operator with his “wild connectivity.”22 
The taxi driver’s power thus lies in his connection 
to people and places. At the racecourse, I came 
across a bettor whose source of information was a 
rickshaw driver in Bangalore. The rickshaw driver 
supposedly took a horse owner to the Bangalore 
racecourse every day, and as part of his daily route 
received information from the owner on what 
would happen in the races. The rickshaw informer 
was then paid by the bettor in Delhi for informa-
tion on races in Bangalore. He could also be used 
for races in other cities, since the horse owner ap-
parently knew people from Mumbai and Hyder-
abad with whom he shared information. This is an 
example of the way that a driver can become an 
urban specialist, or at least a race specialist: being 
connected not emotionally or by way of kinship, 
but through a physical presence with people con-
sidered to have power in terms of knowing or ma-
nipulating the future.
The bribe- receiving dalal described by Parry, 
the “wildly” connected driver described by Han-
sen and Verkaaik, and the informer in Indian 
racing have something in common. They derive 
their power — and their money — from their con-
nections as well as the demand for their services. 
This is valuable in a system in which unpredict-
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ability is tied to the existence of people thought to 
have power over the future, or the power to plan 
its performance. In the case of betting, the speed 
and geographical scale at which these connections 
come into effect has increased since the introduc-
tion of the cell phone, enabling exchanges to hap-
pen quickly and independent of immediate physi-
cal contact.
For Chipper, the procedure of prediction 
was centered on inside information through the 
cell phone. Even though he did not complain or 
go into details about how the future was fixed, the 
procedure nevertheless was founded upon the idea 
that the future was known to some people and not 
to others. The future was not simply uncertain but 
was known with a particular certainty by the cre-
ators of the racing spectacle and those connected 
to them. This future imagination not only involved 
a speculation on systems of exchange, but also en-
abled an economy of information to exist parallel 
to the economy of betting. Now I will turn to the 
second bettor, Mr. Singh, who dealt with the prob-
lem of fixed futures in a very different way.
Mr. Singh and His Handicap: “It Is All about Math”
The very first day I came to the Delhi racecourse, I 
came with Mr. Singh, who was an uncle of a family 
friend of my in- laws. He picked me up in his car, 
and he gave me a booklet called BOL (translated 
as “speak”), which had all the information of the 
horses running in the races of the day. While his 
driver was steering the car, Mr. Singh gave me a 
quick introduction to how to “pick a winner” and 
told me, “It is all about math.” He went through 
the various numerical variables of the horses’ sta-
tistics before choosing his bet.
Mr. Singh was an unmarried man in his 
sixties who spent most of his time either at the 
racecourse or in his small bedroom in his large 
apartment, the majority of which he rented out. 
His room was covered with romantic posters of 
horses, a number of prizes from past races that his 
horses had won, and a large flat- screen television 
on which he watched American sitcoms. He was 
short with a strong build and melancholic eyes hid-
ing under dark heavy glasses. He always wore beige 
khaki trousers and a pastel- colored short- sleeved 
shirt suffused with the scent of cologne. Mr. Singh 
was known at the racecourse to be a good “handi-
capper,” a term used for a bettor applying the 
method of handicapping.
Handicapping is a method of calculating 
probabilities based on previous performance of 
horses and present conditions. Officially this is 
done by a person employed by the racecourse man-
agement, whose job it is to set the terms for the 
races. The handicapper decides which class (there 
are five classes) each horse should be running in 
and how much weight they should be carrying in 
their saddles. This process of handicapping cre-
ates a somewhat equal opportunity for the horses 
to win in the various handicap races, which is nec-
essary for a sustainable betting market to exist, as 
bets are spread out on the various horses. What 
the official handicapper and the bettor termed 
a “handicapper” have in common is the use of 
statistics.
I came to know from Mr. Singh that the in-
formation given in BOL was central to the method 
of the handicap bettor. The BOL was a small book-
let printed on thin paper and sold for 15 rupees at 
the entrance of the racecourse. The booklet was 
filled with small letters and numbers providing a 
variety of information that could be relevant for 
the handicapper, including the age of the horse, 
the distance it had been running, the weight it 
was carrying, the breed, the timing and length of 
its last race, what shoes it was wearing, whether it 
was wearing blinders, and whether the jockey was 
carrying a whip, as well as the name of the jockey, 
trainer, and owner and the class of the race.
Handicapping is therefore a time-consuming 
methodology. Mr. Singh at times brought a thick 
book of results covering the whole previous season, 
which was available at each racecourse, so that he 
could “study the performance” of each horse in 
detail. The level of calculations that went into his 
picking a horse meant that he had very little time 
to chat with other bettors, and he kept mostly to 
himself. He would sit in the same chair every day 
in the members’ room watching the races. Once a 
week, during the live Delhi races, he was one of the 
few that would go to watch the horses in the pad-
dock before the races to “see their condition.” De-
spite his limited social interaction, most people at 
the racecourse knew of Mr. Singh and were aware 
of his handicapping method. They would describe 
him as someone who had “knowledge.”
23. Saini and Sethi, Law Relating to Gambling, 
53.
24. Birla, Stages of Capital.
25. Chettiyappaya, “The Bangalore Turf Club.” 
Tamasha means a spectacle or an event with 
bustle and excitement. It has connotations of 
both play and theatrical entertainment. It can 
be used in a positive context to describe a fun 
activity and in a negative context to convey a 
deceptive show (as commonly used to describe 
Indian politics). The use of sahib log’s tamasha 
points to the idea not only of a sport for the 
elite, but also of a sport staged by the elite.
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Most often handicapping would be associ-
ated with elder men of the upper- middle and 
upper class, and it was a sign of a certain level of 
education and ties with horses. Also, handicap-
ping as a method of prediction is central to the 
legality of horse- race betting. Horse racing’s legal 
status is based on the Supreme Court ruling, the 
most recent from 1996, that solidifies it is a “game 
of skill” for which “success depends principally 
upon the superior knowledge, training, attention, 
experience and adroitness of the player.”23 This 
is opposed to “games of chance,” which on the 
contrary are considered illegal, a distinction that 
was established approximately one hundred years 
earlier during British colonialism,24 when horse 
racing by the Indian public was called sahib log’s 
tamasha, or “spectacle of the upper classes.”25 As 
the basic practice of calculation based on knowl-
edge, handicapping brings legitimacy to horse- 
race betting, emphasizing it as a game of skill de-
pendent on knowledge of horses. When those at 
the racecourse would let me know in his presence 
that “Mr. Singh is a great handicapper,” he would 
clearly enjoy the compliment. When I spoke with 
bettors who were aware that I was interacting with 
a large number of different bettors, some would 
advise me to only follow the counsel of Mr. Singh 
and preferably not talk to anyone else. Yet, others 
would say that “Mr. Singh is knowledgeable, but 
he often fails. . . . Poor Mr. Singh, he keeps los-
ing.” The limitation of Mr. Singh’s method and 
knowledge was tied to the existence of fixed races, 
where knowledge about horses was not considered 
to be enough. Mr. Singh was fully aware of this 
problem.
On my first day of coming to the racecourse 
with Mr. Singh, after browsing through the BOL 
he advised me to bet on Oriental Speed in the up-
coming race, which he told me was a “safe bet.” 
I felt confident that I was in good hands when 
Oriental Speed took off far ahead of all the other 
horses. However, just before the finish line, Ori-
ental Speed fell to the ground dead! When this 
happened Mr. Singh laughed and told me that 
the horse had been drugged. While this was not 
a common statement, I did hear of horses being 
held back by jockeys, having nails put up their 
shoes and being starved before races to prevent 
them from winning. When the horse fell down 
dead in front of our eyes, I was surprised by the 
lack of sympathy Mr. Singh showed for the horse, 
considering that he was a horse owner himself. On 
the same day he took me to the stables next to the 
racecourse where he slightly awkwardly hand- fed 
one of his horses, Tequila, some carrots. Mr. Singh 
had been coming to the racecourse daily for the 
past forty years, and throughout that time he had 
owned a small number of horses. His enthusiasm 
about his horses, however, was limited, and he kept 
his last two now, mostly for nostalgic reasons. One 
of the biggest problems with keeping a horse for 
him was that he never trusted any of his trainers. 
Being fooled by trainers and jockeys, who he pre-
sumed would go behind his back and “pull” his 
horses, had made keeping horses “such a pain,” 
he said, suggesting that his horses were used for 
race fixing without his permission. Race fixing was 
a problem for him not only as a horse owner, but 
even more so as a bettor, and Mr. Singh would give 
voice to these worries on a daily basis. According 
to Mr. Singh, the morality of the racecourse was 
in decline, as the bookmaking market was increas-
ingly taking over the sport by determining the per-
formance of the horses.
As I got to know Mr. Singh a bit better, I 
learned that he had a handicapping method 
through which he tried to take the possibility of 
fixed races into account. One day when I visited 
his home, he showed me a notebook that he never 
brought to the racecourse. In the book he made 
a note every time he noticed something dubious 
that made him think that a horse might have been 
pulled. Before going to the races, he would take 
these notes into account when estimating these 
horses’ chances in upcoming races. He also paid 
careful attention to the constellation of the owner, 
trainer, and jockey, looking for patterns in how 
races were fixed and who was involved. Through 
26. Reith, The Age of Chance, and Reith, “The 
Pursuit of Chance.”
27. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, and 
Hacking, The Taming of Chance.
28. See Puri, “Gambling Is Gambling.”
29. Miyazaki and Riles, “Failure as Endpoint,” 
320.
30. Ibid., 326.
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this method, he was not only assessing the horses 
but also gauging the people behind the horses.
As part of handicapping I noticed that pedi-
gree, a central variable in horse racing in places 
like England and the United States, was never 
considered to have a major effect on the horse. 
This neglect of the pedigree of the horses among 
bettors was in sharp contrast to how people were 
viewed outside the racecourse in Delhi, where kin-
ship was considered an important determinant 
of people’s possibilities and potentials. Inside the 
racecourse, genes and the family heritage of the 
horses were not used to measure the horses’ future 
success — not even among handicappers. Rather, it 
was the people behind the horses, and their rela-
tionships, that engendered the probabilities.
Race fixing represents a crucial problem 
for the method of handicapping, which is based 
on the calculation of stochastic probabilities. 
Nevertheless, in handicapping one can integrate 
manipulations as a variable in the calculation of 
probabilities. Mr. Singh’s personal method of 
handicapping gives insight into how knowledge 
of a manipulated future can be sought through a 
mixture of figuring out the intentions of people 
and mathematical calculations. This exemplifies 
speculation as a form of knowledge production in 
between calculation and suspicion.
Mr. Singh and Chipper shared the assump-
tion that the races were possibly being fixed; how-
ever, they employed two different procedures for 
predicting the possibly fixed future. Whereas the 
younger generation of bettors, like Chipper, are 
oriented toward insider information by paying for 
it or getting a tip from someone who might have 
good contacts, the older generation are more in-
clined to do some version of handicapping. Yet, ac-
cording to both generations, I was told that “nowa-
days handicapping is not enough,” and the older 
cohort clearly felt threatened by the youngsters 
with their cell phones. The older age group talked 
of a shift in the ethics of racing that demanded a 
shift in the calculative ethos as well.
Coarse Accounting
Gerda Reith, in her historical examination of gam-
bling in Western civilization, has traced a devel-
opment from imperial Rome until today in terms 
of how outcomes are believed to be determined 
as reflected in shifting gambling practices. Reith 
tracks this movement from the early idea of divine 
powers interfering with nature to the dominance 
of chance as part of the laws of nature,26 which is 
parallel to what Ian Hacking has described in his 
historical genealogy of the development of prob-
ability and statistics.27 The development of the 
use of statistical methods in gambling is thus tied 
to the establishment of a belief in stochastic out-
comes. Yet, at the Delhi racecourse, there was a 
belief neither in divine interference nor in chance, 
but in humanly created outcomes subject to both 
the strict rules of the game and the socioeco-
nomic context and systems of exchange in which 
the game takes place. This demanded procedures 
of prediction that were neither about praying for 
divine help, which bettors made clear they would 
never do considering gambling is morally bad,28 
nor focused on mathematical calculation of em-
pirically determined probabilities. Rather, the pro-
cess was oriented toward predicting the intentions 
of people considered to have the power to control 
the spectacle of horse racing.
In examining shifts in procedures of predic-
tion, I see some interesting similarities in develop-
ments in the methods of forecasting described not 
only in gambling, which I will return to in the next 
paragraph, but also in ethnographies of financial 
markets. In an article based on studies of financial 
firms, Hirokazu Miyazaki and Annelise Riles de-
scribe the current time in finance as a stage that 
manifests a “failure of economic knowledge.”29 
They identify a shift in the methods of acquiring 
knowledge where Japanese traders have gone from 
reading economic books to reading books on social 
relations and on how to read other people’s minds.30 
This is because the knowledge needed for predict-
ing markets is knowledge about the people in the 
markets, rather than the prospects of its financial 
products. Caitlin Zaloom has observed a similar 
31. Zaloom, “Ambiguous Numbers.” 32. See Miyazaki, Arbitraging Japan, and Mi-
yazaki, “Economy of Dreams.”
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shift in US and British futures markets, from “in-
terpretative analysis” based on economic models 
toward a focus on how people are acting in the 
market. According to Zaloom, market movements 
were interpreted as signs of other market players’ 
intentions and considered a central clue to the fu-
ture direction of the market.31 Miyazaki breaks the 
shift in the knowledge production of finance into 
three stages, which he has identified through an 
ethnographic study of a single person, Tada, who 
worked in a Japanese financial securities firm over 
a period of approximately ten years. Tada started 
out in his job using a methodology stemming from 
logic, mathematical calculations, and models.32 As 
this approach seemed to fail, he shifted to a strategy 
of following inside information, which implied tak-
ing larger risks. Eventually he abandoned this strat-
egy after having had tremendous losses, which he 
blamed on the lack of reliability of his connections. 
He then shifted to a third strategy, which com-
bined the previous two, as he developed a system 
of calculating people’s trustworthiness. To carry out 
this method Tada developed complex accounting 
sheets, which he used to predict various outcomes.
A parallel can be drawn between the shifts in 
Tada’s methods and changes in the methods of bet-
ting at the racecourse in terms of the knowledge 
applied in order to predict the future. Handicap-
ping, in which mathematical skills are combined 
with knowledge of horses at the racecourse, mainly 
exists as an idea of a method that well- educated 
bettors are using. Just as in financial markets there 
is a failure of economic knowledge, as argued by 
Miyazaki and Riles, at the Delhi racecourse there 
was a failure of horse knowledge. Wagering on 
the future based on inside information is similar 
to the method of Chipper, for whom the reliabil-
ity of the source is central to his success. The type 
of method for prediction that Mr. Singh is apply-
ing when he marks down signs of manipulation in 
races, combining this knowledge with an estima-
tion of the horses’ abilities and patterns suggest-
ing how certain constellations of people are ma-
nipulating outcomes, is more about calculating the 
intentions and to some extent also the trustworthi-
ness of people. He is trying to forecast the future 
by identifying patterns in how people are attempt-
ing to manage outcomes.
This way of integrating calculations of social 
relations can furthermore be illustrated through 
the method of keeping accounts of wins and losses, 
which not only Mr. Singh but most other bettors 
did. Whereas Mr. Singh had a written accounting 
sheet at home, Chipper retained it by memory. I 
came to learn that the method around which ac-
counts were made on wins and losses had a certain 
pattern: (1) The account was temporally divided 
into months and the racing season as a whole from 
September to May, and (2) it was geographically 
divided into the different racecourses in which the 
races had taken place. Bettors would thus keep ap-
proximately seven separate accounts concurrently 
covering the whole season and would separate 
them into Delhi races, Mumbai races, Pune races, 
Bangalore races, Hyderabad races, Mysore races, 
and Kolkata races. The bettors’ way of structur-
ing the past through their profits enabled them 
to evaluate their strategies not simply by the total 
number of wins and losses, but by wins and losses 
set in the different socioeconomic settings in 
which the races were happening. For example, Mr. 
Singh would say, “I am in minus in Mumbai and 
Pune, but I am in plus in Delhi.” Chipper would 
say upon winning a large amount, “Now I am back 
in Delhi races,” which meant that he was now on 
the plus side of his Delhi races account.
When trying to understand the patterns of 
the races, the bettors were looking not only at the 
horses but at the centers in which the races were 
taking place. In India, horse owners, trainers, and 
jockeys generally stick to a single racecourse, except 
at cup or invitation races such as the derby. Each 
Bangalore race, for example, almost always involves 
the same actors. Some horse owners are known to 
pull their horses more than others, or a specific 
combination of jockey and trainer may be consid-
ered to be a constellation whereby the likelihood of 
a horse being pulled is taken into account based on 
assessments of previous races with that team. Keep-
ing accounts of a specific center is therefore a way 
to keep track of economies and relationships that 
determine the performance of the races.
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For Chipper, he used this accounting to ana-
lyze his information source. After a month’s rac-
ing, he evaluated whether his source had been 
mostly right or wrong, and more important, in 
which racing centers the source had been correct. 
Then he could adjust his use of the information 
source accordingly and have various sources give 
information from different racecourses. Once 
he knew that he had failed because of a certain 
source, he could replace that source for that par-
ticular racecourse.
Accounts are also kept for each individual 
racecourse, as each racecourse is considered to 
have distinct economies and ethics influencing 
the conditions of the races. People’s perceptions 
of the Delhi racecourse are the same, whether you 
talk to a regular bettor in Delhi or a bettor at one 
of the other racecourses. In the words of a bettor 
at the Mysore racecourse: “In Delhi you don’t use 
handicapping; handicapping is not enough there. 
At Delhi racecourse there is a lot of pulling [of 
horses].” He thus used different methods at dif-
ferent centers, emphasizing that handicapping 
as a method did not work for races held in Delhi 
because inside information was needed in that 
setting.
The Mumbai racecourse, conversely, is con-
sidered to have the most races with people actu-
ally wanting their horses to win. “In Mumbai the 
owners are very rich. They don’t need the money; 
they just want to have their picture taken [when 
receiving the prize],” I was told by Mr. Singh. That 
said, the mafia is believed to be more involved in 
Mumbai than at other racecourses, which means 
that the possibility of fixed races still looms in the 
background, as the mafia can go behind the backs 
of the fame- seeking owners and strike deals with 
the jockeys.
Hyderabad racecourse was considered the 
most “developed” course. “Developed” meant that 
it was run in such a way that the rules and economy 
of modern institutions had a greater impact on the 
results. It was the only racecourse in India that 
owned the land on which the horses were running. 
This racecourse, unlike the others in the coun-
try, was situated not on the original piece of land 
where the racecourse had been built by the British 
in the political power center, but on land that had 
been bought after Indian independence by the 
race club at the margins of the city. Bettors there-
fore considered the racecourse to be more inde-
pendent from politicians, who I was told provided 
the race clubs with the leases in return for bribes. 
Considering that the Hyderabad racecourse club 
did not have to pay the enormous rent — along with 
bribes — the club could offer some of the highest 
prizes for the winning horses in the country be-
cause of its good internal finances. The racecourse 
also had an education center, where jockeys, train-
ers, handicappers, and racecourse managers were 
given a formal education and degree. Therefore, 
in Hyderabad it was considered more likely that 
the people behind the horses would aim to win 
the races with the required competences instead 
of making money at betting.
What is interesting, however, is that the Hy-
derabad races are not more popular than the 
Delhi and Mumbai races among bettors at the 
Delhi racecourse. The reason is that if all horses 
are trying to win a race, it can be more difficult to 
predict the race, as was pointed out to me: “When 
the stakes [winning prices] are high, at least six or 
eight horses will try [to win].” This is different from 
other races with low winning prizes, where many of 
the horses are considered “not on the job,” as they 
are just running as pawns in a larger game. Com-
pared to the Delhi and Mumbai races, there is less 
betting at the races of Hyderabad, suggesting that 
part of the attraction of betting is figuring out the 
possibly performed future.
Whether based on one’s calculative skills or 
an information source, keeping an account of wins 
and losses divided among the different racing cen-
ters allows bettors to evaluate their own strategies 
in relationship to larger economic systems in which 
the races are taking place. Regional stereotypes of 
greedy “Delhi- wallahs,” fame- seeking Mumbaiites 
close to the mafia, and professional Hyderabadis 
known for their IT businesses and international 
standards were reinforced and acted upon at the 
racecourse. The prediction of race fixing thus 
depends on the perception of the racecourse, its 
surroundings, and its people, and therefore the 
method of prediction is adjusted according to 
where the races are taking place. Betting methods 
are not only tied to the possibility of race fixing 
in horse racing at large, but rather embedded in 
perceptions of local economies and ethics. There-
33. Van Wyk, “Tata ma Chance.”
34. Jansbøl, Det Danske Spillemiljø.
35. See Oldman, “Chance and Skill,” 419, and 
Sallaz, Labor of Luck, 11.
36. See Jansbøl, Det Danske Spillemiljø, and 
Hayano, Poker Faces.
37. Bjerg, Poker.
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fore, statistics are used not just in order to predict 
horses through handicapping, but also in an at-
tempt to evaluate the patterns of each racecourse’s 
economy through account keeping.
What I have identified both in the case of Mr. 
Singh’s use of handicapping and in the method of 
keeping account is how statistics are used creatively 
to predict futures beyond a belief in stochastic out-
comes. The use of simple statistics, therefore, does 
not necessarily represent a universal surrender to 
laws of chance predictable through mathematical 
models, but it can also indicate an active engage-
ment with a context- specific interpretation of un-
certainty. Locating the engagement with uncer-
tainty in the various geographical settings in India 
brings insight into the embeddedness of specula-
tion implied in both finance and gambling. I will 
return to the anthropology of gambling below, in 
order to provide another level of comparison.
Venturing beyond India
Speculations on possible manipulations of out-
comes in gambling are not unique to India. It is 
likewise commonly assumed among lottery play-
ers in South Africa that the numbers are not ran-
domly picked but purposely chosen by those pow-
erful men running the lottery. Among the poor 
people of South Africa, according to Ilana Van 
Wyk, they turn to diviners for help in picking the 
right numbers in such circumstances, though with 
a fair amount of skepticism.33 At the roulette ta-
bles in Danish casinos, players, according to Kåre 
Jansbøl, pay attention to the intentionality of the 
croupiers throwing the ball, assuming that they 
are not simply producing a random outcome but 
are aiming at particular numbers.34 Similar situa-
tions have been observed at American and South 
African casinos.35 Thus, even at modes of gambling 
associated with chance, such as lotteries and rou-
lette, intentional outcomes are assumed, showing 
a disbelief in the chances of stochastic outcomes.
In forms of gambling more commonly as-
sociated with skill such as poker, it is an integral 
part of the game to figure out the intention of the 
other players.36 In poker, similar to the develop-
ment in predictive procedures in financial mar-
kets, Ole Bjerg has identified a number of shifts in 
the methods of playing, which he links to bigger 
changes in capitalism.37 He argues that there was 
a shift in the early 1970s, where players went from 
using mathematical skills in order to calculate the 
odds of drawing particular cards to focusing on 
being able to understand the human games and 
characters behind the cards. He connects this shift 
with the development of financial capitalism from 
1971 on, where capitalism has increasingly devel-
oped as an economy of signs and where financial 
speculation has come to dominate the economy. 
According to Bjerg, shifts in the economic systems 
at large and ways in which value are generated are 
thus reflected in the game of poker.
Similarly, based on the narratives of elder 
bettors at the racecourse, there was a noticeable 
change in betting methods over the last twenty 
years where betting had gradually become less 
about knowing about the horses. This time frame 
coincides with the onset of the “New India” in 
1991, when neoliberal economic policies tied the 
Indian economy to global finance. Furthermore, 
bookmakers emphasize 1995 as a year of an im-
portant transformation, since this was the year 
in which the cell phone was introduced in India. 
This has meant a gradual increase in phone- based 
betting, and for the bettors, much easier access to 
inside information across the country. Thus devel-
opments in politics and technologies have enabled 
the exchange of both money and information to 
exist in new ways.
Whereas assumption of manipulations of 
outcomes exists in other gambling settings, judg-
ing from two short fieldtrips to Klampenborg 
racecourse in Denmark in 2010 and 2011, I did not 
identify similar ways of assuming the presence of 
race fixing. Here the primary focus seemed to be 
directed more at the potential of the horses and 
the ability of the jockeys to ride them than at the 
hidden intentions of the jockeys and horse owners. 
By drawing on this comparison, I am not claiming 
38. Appadurai, “Imagined Worlds.”
39. Existing ethnographies include Zaloom, Out 
of the Pits; Zaloom, “How to Read the Future”; 
Zaloom, “Ambiguous Numbers”; Zaloom, “The 
Discipline of Speculators”; Miyazaki, “Econ-
omy of Dreams”; Miyazaki and Riles, “Failure 
as Endpoint”; Miyazaki, Arbitraging Japan; 
Beunza and Garud, “Calculators, Lemmings or 
Frame- makers?”; and Clark et al., “Performing 
Finance.”
40. On India, see Birla, Stages of Capital. On 
the West, see Loussouarn, “Spread Betting 
and the City of London”; Fabian, Card Sharps; 
and Munting, An Economic and Social History 
of Gambling.
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that there are fewer instances of race fixing in a 
Danish setting, which I am unable to determine, 
but simply that this reveals differences in the per-
ceptions of what controls the future and the poten-
tial of human agency. During a short trip I made 
to the Belmont racecourse in New York in 2011, 
bettors expressed concern for race manipulations 
done through performance- enhancing drugs. 
This was different from manipulations at the Delhi 
racecourse, which conversely were done by refrain-
ing a horse from winning. Bettors in New York 
were taking into consideration the large amount of 
prize money allocated for the winner, in contrast 
to most Indian races. These differences illustrate 
very well how the perception of future contingency 
is embedded in local economies and its economic 
structure and perception, similar to the ways in 
which bettors interpreted the races of the various 
Indian racecourses differently. Thus there is both 
a geographical and a temporal scale at which varia-
tions and shifts in the underlying structures of un-
certainty are imagined and engaged with.
Even though horse- race betting is on the 
rise in India, cricket betting represents the largest 
gambling market, even though it is illegal. Appad-
urai has shown how cricket through time has been 
tied to first colonialism, then nationalism, and 
more recently corporatism.38 Today, there is also 
a rising anxiety tied to the betting market and the 
match fixing associated with it. The real players in 
the game — those that decide the outcomes — are 
believed to be the bookmakers and the mafia ex-
tending beyond the borders of India. Thus sports, 
as in other spheres of life, are further subject to 
global financialization, which marks shifts to a 
more speculative approach to future events. As 
part of this larger development, the skill of horse 
racing at the Delhi racecourse according to bettors 
had to do not only with being smart but also with 
being connected. This mirrors a dominant percep-
tion of power in contemporary India.
Conclusion
The Delhi racecourse offers an opportunity to ex-
amine embedded speculations in a simplified and 
bounded risk market. In the article, I have illus-
trated how the speculations on future events were 
embedded in local economies. While this brings 
insight into perceptions of power and exchange in 
India, it also enables an analysis of parallel shifts in 
methods for predicting the future in other national 
and financial contexts. Central to understanding 
the calculative ethos of risk markets, then, is an 
attention to existing systems of exchange of money 
and information and the speculations on these in 
between the visible spectacles and the concealed 
transactions. Contextualized uncertainties, how-
ever, have not fully been explored in existing eth-
nographies of financial speculation.39
By foregrounding the predictive practices 
involved in gambling at the Delhi racecourse, the 
distinction between gambling associated with irra-
tional and rapid modes of decision making and fi-
nancial speculation considered grounded in long- 
term calculative methods is thus blurred. This is 
a distinction established legally and popularly in 
the nineteenth century in India and in the West.40 
Bettors at the Delhi racecourse consistently make 
parallels between horse- race betting and financial 
speculation. Examining their procedures for pre-
diction unpacked embedded future imaginaries.
At the Delhi racecourse, the future did not 
exist as an unknown event that was to unfold, but 
as a performed event controlled by people in the 
industry. The idea of the races being possibly ma-
nipulated directed attention to the people behind 
the horses and their relationships of exchange 
rather than the horses themselves. The possi-
bilities of a horse winning were not related to the 
horses’ capabilities but to the power and connec-
tions of the people behind them. This future imag-
inary brought along with it various procedures for 
prediction focused on inside information and the 
calculation of the patterns of behavior within vari-
ous economic contexts. In other words, as the ex-
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istence of race fixing could never fully be known, 
the racecourse could exist as a speculative space 
where prediction developed in between calcula-
tion, information sharing, and imaginaries of con-
cealed economies.
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